Blind quantum computation is an appealing use of quantum information technology because it can conceal both the client's data and the algorithm itself from the server. However, problems need to be solved in the practical use of blind quantum computation and fault-tolerance is a major challenge. Broadbent et al. proposed running error correction over blind quantum computation, and Morimae and Fujii proposed using fault-tolerant entangled qubits as the resource for blind quantum computation. Both approaches impose severe demands on the teleportation channel, the former requiring unrealistic data rates and the latter nearperfect fidelity. To extend the application range of blind quantum computation, we suggest that Alice send input qubits encoded with error correction code instead of single input qubits. Two fault-tolerant protocols are presented and we showed the trade-off of the computational overhead using the ten-bit quantum carrylookahead adder as an example. Though these two fault-tolerant protocols require the client to have more quantum computing ability than using approaches from prior work, they provide better fault-tolerance when the client and the server are connected by realistic quantum repeater networks.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum computation shows great potential for solving some important problems faster than classical computation [Mosca 2008; Bacon and van Dam 2010; Kassal et al. 2011; Jones et al. 2012b ]. However, a practical quantum computer needs to be large enough to handle sufficient numbers of delicate qubits, perhaps extending into the high millions or low billions of physical qubits [Van Meter et al. 2010; Jones et al. 2012a ]. Large-scale quantum "mainframes" will be valuable resources, and time-sharing of machines will be economically attractive. Time-sharing quantum cloud services will allow owners of smaller quantum computers to perform large quantum computations. Sometimes the input and output data are private and even the choice of quantum computing algorithm may be sensitive information, so this information has to be kept secret even from the server. Universal blind quantum computation is a powerful technique that can let the client execute a quantum computation on a server without revealing any information about the computation except an upper bound on the size [Broadbent et al. 2009 ], akin to classical homomorphic encryption but with a much more tractable performance penalty relative to an unencrypted computation.
Universal blind quantum computation makes use of a special feature of measurement-based quantum computation [Raussendorf and Briegel 2001; Raussendorf et al. 2003 ], which allows a quantum computation to be divided into quantum operations and classical computations. Measurement-based quantum computation uses entangled qubits as resources and the computation is performed only by a sequence of measurements. The type of measurements determines the quantum operation effectively performed on the input qubits. In blind quantum computation, the client prepares qubits and decides the type of measurements while the server does most of the quantum operations. The inputs are encrypted in the qubits prepared by the client, and the measurements are also cryptographically randomized so that they are independent of the real computation. Thus, from the server's point of view, all the received quantum and classical information appears random. Blind quantum computation with four qubits was experimentally demonstrated in 2012 [Barz et al. 2012] .
A practical blind quantum computing system requires the ability to operate in the presence of errors. Because of imperfect computing devices or a noisy transmission channel, errors may occur during qubit preparation, quantum transmission, and quantum computation. The client and server are connected by a long and noisy channel, or more likely a quantum repeater network [Dür et al. 1999; Gisin and Thew 2007; Kimble 2008; Van Meter 2012; Van Meter and Touch 2013] . Over a repeater network, the qubits are teleported from Alice to Bob, imposing serious challenges but offering an opportunity to improve the overall security, discussed below.
Broadbent et al. suggested doing a fault-tolerant quantum computation as a target computation in their scheme. The error correction itself, including syndrome measurement and corrections, would be performed as a blind computation, necessitating enormous amounts of low-latency, near-real-time classical communication. It also requires a teleportation rate sufficient to support real-time quantum error correction, rendering the scheme effectively impossible. Morimae and Fujii [2012] proposed a fault-tolerant scheme for blind quantum computation. They altered Broadbent et al.'s blind quantum computation by using a fault-tolerant form of entangled qubits. However, quantum error correction is applied only on the server side, which requires the quantum channel to be effectively perfect. For extensive use of blind quantum computation, we suggest that the client send input qubits encoded using quantum error correction. Thus, the protocol will be more robust to noise in the quantum channel. In addition, it creates the possibility of applying quantum error correction at some interim stage of quantum transmission between the server and client.
Based on Broadbent et al.' s approach, we propose our first fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol, which uses a quantum error correction code and faulttolerant quantum circuits. Taking the same idea originally proposed in Aharonov et al. [2008] , the client has to do fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare logical qubits encoded with a quantum error correction code. In addition, the server has to conduct fault-tolerant entanglements and measurements on the encoded logical qubits. Compared to the previous fault-tolerant schemes, this protocol provides better faulttolerant capability against a noisy quantum channel because qubit errors that occur during preparation and transmission can be corrected immediately after the server receives the qubits or can be corrected by a relay node in the middle of transmission. In addition, Broadbent et al.'s fault-tolerant protocol applies quantum error correction on top of the basic blind quantum computation, while our fault-tolerant protocol applies quantum error correction underneath the basic blind quantum computation. In comparison to Broadbent et al.' s basic blind quantum computation protocol, the number of qubits used in our first fault-tolerant protocol is increased by a constant factor, while the number of qubits used in their fault-tolerant protocol grows linearly with the size of the input. A major drawback of our first fault-tolerant protocol is that the client is required to do a lot of quantum computation for the fault-tolerant preparation of encoded logical qubits. Since the client is assumed to have limited quantum computing power, our first protocol needs to be improved. In our first fault-tolerant protocol, the client may also leak some information which can be exploited by a side-channel attack.
To reduce the client's large quantum computing overhead and eliminate the side channel attack, we propose our second fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol. This protocol sacrifices perfect blindness in exchange for a low quantum computing overhead. The client requires only the ability to execute quantum teleportation and additional quantum S gates. Two kinds of error-corrected qubits will be initially prepared fault-tolerantly by the server. For each pair of different encoded qubits teleported to the client, one will be manipulated and teleported back by the client, and the other one will be measured by the client to test if the server is honest. Compared to the previous fault-tolerant schemes, this protocol provides better fault-tolerant capability against a noisy quantum channel. Though the protocol doesn't provides perfect blindness when using a direct quantum channel, it reveals only a limited part of the quantum operations. Quantum inputs and outputs are still perfectly blind to the server. When using quantum teleportation, Alice keeps secret the Pauli frame corrections, retaining full blindness even with a cheating Bob or network. Although the client still has modest requirements for computational capability, this protocol has the lowest network overhead of any proposed blind protocol. The idea of the client manipulating prepared encoded qubits can be applied to other protocols to make them more fault-tolerant against quantum channel noise.
This article is the first work analysing the quantum computation overhead of the client. In Section 2, we will introduce related work. In Section 3, we will describe the first protocol of fault-tolerant blind quantum computation using fault-tolerant circuit. In Section 4, we will present the second protocol to reduce the client's computation effort. In Section 5, we will analyse and compare the computation overhead between different protocols. Section 6 will be the conclusion.
RELATED WORK
Protecting the client's private data from the computing server during a computation is a long-standing problem, but if achievable it is valuable for cloud computing. In 2009, this problem was solved both in classical computing and quantum computing. Gentry proposed a fully homomorphic encryption which makes it possible to perform mathematical operations directly on encrypted data and get the result in an encrypted form which can be decrypted only by someone holding the original encryption key [Childs 2005; Gentry 2009a; 2009b] . Broadbent et al. proposed a universal blind quantum computation which allows the client to utilize the quantum computing power on the server without revealing the computation, including input, output and even the algorithm. The security of classical homomorphic encryption is based on difficult mathematical problems, while the security of the blind quantum computation is based on the physical properties of quantum systems, assuming the client has a good source of classical random bits. Homomorphic encryption has enormous computing overhead and the server learns what computation is being performed, even though it learns nothing about the data. Blind computation has been proven to be theoretically secure, and Barz et al. [2012] went to some length to establish a maximum amount of information leakage from the quantum state used in their version of the protocol. However, real-world systems always differ in some respects from the idealized abstractions of theoretical algorithms and proofs, much to the chagrin of many security systems implementers. Barz et al. recognize this distinction and articulate some of the issues.
From our proof-of-principle experiment to a full implementation of the BQC scheme, there are several technical challenges to be faced: Emitted photons that do not contribute to the generation of the cluster state can in principle reveal information about the blind phases. Furthermore, postselection and photon losses decrease the efficiency of the protocol. Therefore, the realization of single-qubit states on demand and the heralded generation of blind cluster states using measurement-induced interactions with high fidelity and low losses will be crucial for future applications.
The introduction of fault tolerance likewise adds one additional facet of the system that must be implemented correctly to guarantee blindness. Childs [2006] first proposed the idea of blind quantum computation and proved that the client can conceal the quantum input and output from the server. But the protocol requires the client to have a fault-tolerant quantum memory and to do quantum operations. Arrighi and Salvail [2006] proposed another approach which lets the server compute multiple quantum inputs, most of which are decoys. This approach can't do universal computation and the real quantum inputs are not encrypted. Broadbent et al. proposed the first universal blind quantum computation using the measurementbased quantum computation model [Raussendorf et al. 2003; Broadbent et al. 2009 ]. The client is only required to prepare a large set of qubits one at a time, randomly chosen from a finite set, and to send the qubits to the server. Dunjko et al. [2012] pointed out the difficulties of preparing and sending qubits over a long distance. They proposed a remote blind qubit state preparation protocol that requires Alice to prepare only weak coherent pulses, but the blindness will not be perfect. Morimae and Fujii [2012] show a fault-tolerant blind quantum computation using topologically protected measurement-based quantum computation. Their approach uses a more fault-tolerant computation model on the server, but the input qubits are still not protected during the transmission. Other different blind quantum computation schemes also have been proposed recently [Chia et al. 2012; Sueki et al. 2013] . Compared to the prior protocols, our protocol applies quantum error correction on the client so that the input qubits can be protected during the transmission, while the client still has relatively low resource requirements. Our work covers three areas in quantum computation, including measurement-based quantum computation, universal blind quantum computation, and quantum error correction. We will introduce the basic concept of quantum computation first. Then we will describe each area in the following sections.
Basic Quantum Computation
A qubit is a basic unit of quantum information, which is stored on a two-state quantummechanical system, for instance, the polarization of a single photon or the spin of a single electron [Nielsen and Chuang 2010; . A qubit is a superposition of two basis states, and it is generally represented using the ket notation as |ψ = α|0 + β|1 , where α and β are probability amplitudes, and α, β ∈ C. |0 and |1 are ket notations for the basis vectors ( 1 0 ) and ( 0 1 ). When we measure this qubit in the computational (standard) basis M Z = {|0 , |1 }, the outcome is |0 with probability |α| 2 and |1 with probability |β| 2 . More precisely, (α, β) can be represented as (cos(θ/2), e iφ sin(θ/2)), where 0 ≤ θ, φ < 2π , and φ is called the phase. Two or more qubits can be entangled, and they will be in a superposition of quantum states, which means we can only learn the state of the whole system but not any one of the qubits individually. For example, a common pair of qubits called a Bell pair or EPR pair is represented as
, where the subscript is the index of qubits. If we measure the first qubit of the entangled state | + and the measurement result is |1 , the second qubit will become |1 . It seems that the two qubits in the entangled state have a connection. Although the state of each qubit is random, they are not independent. Their states are correlated in a fashion not explainable by sheer classical probability.
In general, a quantum computation is described using the quantum circuit model in which a computation is a sequence of quantum gates. Quantum gates are unitary operators generally represented by matrices. We can use the vector form to represent the qubit as |ψ = α(
) when we want to calculate the effect of the quantum gates on our state. The following equation shows the matrix form of some quantum gates. 
where I is the identity gate, H is the Hadamard gate, X is the Pauli-X or NOT gate, Z is the Pauli-Z gate, R z (θ ) is the phase shift gate, where 0
) is called the S or phase gate, and
) is the inverse S gate, and R z ( 7π 4 ) is the inverse T gate. CNOT is the controlled-NOT gate. CZ is the controlled-Z gate. CPhase is the controlled-phase gate. Figure 1 shows the diagram of some gates in the quantum circuit model. Each line, called a wire, represents a qubit. The SWAP gate swaps two input qubits. For the CNOT, CZ, and CPhase gates, the upper qubit is the control qubit and the lower qubit is the target qubit. If the control bit is 1, CNOT will apply an X gate on the target qubit, CZ will apply a Z gate on the target qubit, and CPhase will apply an S gate on the target qubit. The Toffoli gate has two control qubits and one target qubit. Only when both control bits are 1, the Toffoli gate will apply an X gate on the target.
A qubit has an infinite number of possible states. When we measure a qubit with an operator M, which is a 2 × 2 Hermitian (self-adjoint) matrix, the qubit will be projected to one of its two eigenstates (eigenvectors) corresponding to the eigenvalue, which is the measurement result. The eigenstates of the operator form an orthonormal basis, thus, we can also use this basis to distinguish the measurement. In quantum computation, we generally measure a qubit in the computational basis {|0 , |1 }, which is the same as measuring with operator Z. Any qubit can be represented as a superposition of the eigenstates of the measurement operator. For example,
When we measure a qubit |ψ in the basis {|0 ± |1 }, which is measuring with operator X, the qubit will be 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 ) with probability 
Measurement-Based Quantum Computation
Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC) or one-way quantum computation is a quantum computation model proposed by Raussendorf and Briegel [2001] and [Raussendorf et al. 2003 ]. MBQC uses an entangled state of many qubits, called a cluster state, as the resource for universal quantum computation. The computation is a sequence of one-qubit measurements on the qubits of this cluster state. Every measurement will destroy the entanglement connection between the measured qubits and the others, and the remaining qubits become a smaller cluster state modified by an operation. The computation is driven by measurements in designated bases. Depending on the measurement basis and the measurement result, we learn something about the state of the remaining entangled qubits. Managed carefully, ultimately the resulting state represents the desired result, a function of our input qubits [Danos and Kashefi 2006] . To prepare a cluster state, we initially prepare all the qubits in |+ = 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 ) state. Then we apply CZ to each nearest neighbour pair. A cluster state can have different structure, for instance, linear, 2-D, or 3-D. To do a computation on the cluster state, we imprint its quantum circuit layout on the substrate cluster state by our choice of measurements. The redundant qubits are removed from the cluster state by being measured in the computational basis. Each remaining qubit is measured in a particular kind of basis M(θ ) = {|0 ± e iθ |1 }, where 0 ≤ θ < 2π , based on the quantum circuit. θ is called the angle of the measurement basis. The upper part of Figure 2 (a) shows a cluster state, which is a 2-dimensional array of cluster state. The lower part of Figure 2 (a) shows the angle θ of the measurement basis M θ of executing a CNOT gate on two qubits using the 2-D cluster. A horizontal line of qubits is analogous to a wire in the quantum circuit diagram; see Figure 1 . The two qubits in the left squares are the inputs, and two qubits in the right squares are the outputs; the upper qubits are the control qubits and the lower qubits are the target qubits. The output qubits have to be corrected by some Pauli gates based on the previous measurement results. The cluster state is generic and can be prepared before the computation, but the redundant qubits can only be removed after the target computation is chosen.
Universal Blind Quantum Computation
Universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) is a special application of measurementbased quantum computation. A client called Alice wants to execute a quantum computation on a server called Bob because she doesn't have enough quantum computing power to run the complete algorithm herself. If Alice wants to conceal her computation from everyone else, including Bob, she can use universal blind quantum computation. Most of the blind quantum computation protocols are similar to the protocol of Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi, which we call BFK.
In order to conceal the computation, blind quantum computation does not use the typical cluster state. In standard MBQC, the computing qubits are measured in the Figure 2 , where the upper part shows the entangled states required to implement a CNOT gate, and the lower part shows the measurement basis to perform a CNOT gate. A brickwork state is a uniform structure, which only reveals the upper bound of the size of the computation. It is a tiling of 10-qubit entangled states, which we call bricks. Each brick can implement a quantum gate, including Hadamard gate, Pauli-X gate, Pauli-Z gate, S gate, T gate, and CNOT gate. This set is sufficient for universal quantum computation [Nielsen and Chuang 2010] . We should note that bricks are interleaved, so quantum gates can only act on specific two adjacent lines of qubits in each layer of the brickwork state. Thus, swap gates are required for implementing quantum gates which operate on two nonadjacent qubits.
In measurement-based quantum computation, the output qubits have to be corrected by some Pauli gates based on the previous measurement results. The correction can be performed on the next measurement by the modification of measurement basis. For a brickwork state of size n × m, let each qubit |ψ x,y be indexed by a column x ∈ 1, . . . n and a row y ∈ 1, . . . , m. Every measurement depends on the previous measurement results, and these results can be assigned to two dependency sets X x,y and Z x,y by the flow construction [Danos and Kashefi 2006] . The measurement basis with correction is φ x,y = (−1)
x,y π , where φ x,y is the original measurement basis for a quantum gate when the qubit is prepared as |+ . If the qubits in the brickwork state are all prepared in the |+ state, then the measurement bases will reveal information about the quantum gate. Thus, each qubit is prepared in a randomly-chosen state from the set {
, where θ x,y is called the angle of the qubit.
In measurement-base quantum computation, measuring a qubit |0 + e iθ |1 in M(θ ) has the same effect as measuring a qubit |0 + |1 in M(0). Therefore, the measurement basis of each qubit in the brickwork state becomes M(φ x,y + θ x,y ). We can see that the measurement basis will be random if θ x,y is random. A random number is also added to the angle of the measurement basis to conceal the quantum information of the qubit, which will also flip the measurement results. The basic steps of BFK's protocol are as follows.
(1) The preparation stage (a) Alice prepares each qubit |ψ x,y randomly chosen from the set { For each row y = 1, . . . ,n in the brickwork state: (a) Alice computes φ x,y based on the real measurement angle φ x,y and the previous measurement results in order to achieve execution of the matching step of the MBQC (e.g., the gate in the application algorithm); (b) Alice chooses a random bit r x,y ∈ {0, 1} and sends the angle δ x,y = φ x,y + θ x,y + πr x,y , where r is a random bit, to Bob via the classical channel; (c) Bob measures |ψ x,y in the basis {|0 ± e iδ x,y |1 } and sends the one-bit result to Alice via the classical channel; (d) If r x,y = 1 above, Alice flips the result bit; otherwise she does nothing.
Steane Code and Fault-tolerant Quantum Computation
There are many different kinds of quantum error correction codes [Gottesman 2009; Devitt et al. 2011; Terhal 2013] . In this article, we will use a quantum error correction code called Steane's [[7, 1, 3] ] code, which uses seven entangled physical qubits to encode one logical qubit and has the ability to correct one physical qubit error [Steane 1996 ]. The [[7,1,3] ] code is a stabilizer code, which is generally described by the stabilizer formalism [Gottesman 1997] . A state |ψ is stabilized by K if K|ψ = |ψ . Every state in the [[7,1,3] ] code is stabilized by these six operators,
Applying any of those operators to the state has no effect on the encoded logical state. Measuring whether the state is in the +1 or −1 eigenstate of each of these operators, as described below, gives us error syndrome information. These operators are useful in the synthesis of quantum circuits for preparing encoded states and error correction. To do a fault-tolerant quantum computation, we need to perform fault-tolerant quantum gates and fault-tolerant measurements on the error-correcting code blocks. A fault-tolerant quantum gate or a fault-tolerant measurement is implemented by a quantum circuit. Any single error in the circuit should not generate two error qubits in the same errorcorrecting code block. Thus, every error correction code block can correct its single qubit error after the fault-tolerant quantum gates or fault-tolerant measurements [Nielsen and Chuang 2010; Devitt et al. 2011] . Any logical qubit |ψ encoded by the [[7,1,3] ] code will be represented by |ψ L . Any fault-tolerant gate U for the [[7,1,3] ] code will be represented by U L . There are two kinds of fault-tolerant gates for the [[7,1,3] ] code. For Clifford group gates, including Identity gates, Hadamard gates, Pauli gates, S gates, and CNOT gates, fault-tolerant gates are implemented by applying gates transversally on each qubit in the code as shown in the left of Figure 4 . For non-Clifford group gates, including T gates, fault-tolerant gates are implemented with the help of additional qubits, called ancilla qubits. The implementation of a fault-tolerant T gate for the [[7,1,3] ] code is shown in Figure 4 (g). The red dashed box is the preparation of a special ancilla logical qubit (|0 + e iπ/4 |1 ) L . If the result of fault-tolerantly measuring the ancilla logical qubit |0 L with operator (e −iπ/4 SX) L is 1, a fault-tolerant Z L is applied to correct the output state. After applying CNOT L on this ancilla logical qubit and the input logical qubit, we fault-tolerantly measure the input logical qubit with operator Z L and then apply fault-tolerant SX on the ancilla logical qubit if the measurement result is 1. The ancilla logical qubit is the output of this gate.
To measure an error correction code state fault-tolerantly, we do not measure them directly. Instead, we use ancilla qubits to extract information from the code state and then measure the ancilla qubits. The measurement result is a majority vote from three repetitions of this measurement procedure. Figure 5 shows a procedure for faulttolerantly measuring operator Z L on the [[7,1,3] ] code. The red dashed box shows seven ancilla qubits being prepared in the state 1 √ 2 (|0000000 + |1111111 ), verified by measuring another ancilla qubit. Fault-tolerant measurements are also used to prepare . Depending on the measurement results, a Z gate may be applied to one of the qubits in the code block to make the correct |0 L state. Figure 6 shows the fault-tolerant preparation of a |0 L state encoded with the [[7,1,3] ] code. By applying additional fault-tolerant quantum gates, any other code state can be prepared. The special state (|0 + e iπ/4 |1 ) L used in the fault-tolerant T gate is prepared by fault-tolerantly measuring operator e −iπ/4 SX on state |0 L as shown in Figure 7 . Quantum error correction is achieved by extracting the error syndrome from the code state and then applying corrections to the code state. The error syndrome extraction for the [[7,1,3] ] code is also performed by fault-tolerantly measuring the code state with the operators
, and K
6
. Depending on the measurement results, a Z gate and a X gate may be applied to one of the qubits in the code to correct the error. Figure 8 shows an example of how to build a fault-tolerant quantum circuit with quantum error correction [Nielsen and Chuang 2010] . Broadbent et al. [2009] showed that their blind quantum computation can be made fault-tolerant. Alice first converts the target computation to a fault-tolerant circuit. The first phase of the circuit is building the quantum state for the input variables, encoding the input data into a quantum error correction code. Within the code block, all qubit wires are permuted. For the non-Clifford group fault-tolerant gates and faulttolerant measurement, ancilla qubits are required and they should be measured in the computational basis. Ancilla qubit wires are added and evenly spaced through the circuit and they are reused. All the ancilla qubits have to be measured at the same time, at a regular interval, after each fault-tolerant gate. Since some of the ancillae are not used at the time of measurement, their measurement results are meaningless. Then Alice converts the fault-tolerant circuit to a measurement-based computation on the brickwork state. Ancilla qubits are still measured in the computational basis, which is different from other measurements. Last, Alice does this fault-tolerant computation using the basic blind quantum computation. In addition, she has to periodically instruct Bob to measure all ancilla qubits in the computational basis.
BFK Fault-Tolerant Blind Quantum Computation
In the FT form of BFK, error correction is run on top of the brickwork state. Bob performs the only quantum operations in this process, but Alice is required to directly process all of the phases of error correction, including syndrome extraction and correction operations. This approach has two drawbacks: first, the amount of classical communication required between Alice and Bob is enormous, and classical communication latencies may become important; second, because the individual underlying qubits are not error-protected, the error rate induced by the initial teleportation stage may become more of an issue.
Blind Topological Measurement-Based Quantum Computation
Morimae and Fujii provided the first concrete fault-tolerant scheme for blind quantum computation and explicitly calculated the error threshold. Their fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol is similar to BFK's basic protocol. The major difference between these two approaches is the structure of the entangled qubits, which is the resource of measurement-based quantum computation. The two-dimensional entangled brickwork state used in BFK's protocol doesn't provide fault-tolerant capabilities, while Morimae and Fujii's scheme is based on a fault-tolerant three-dimensional entangled RHG lattice as proposed by Raussendorf, Harrington, and Goyal [Raussendorf and Harrington 2007; ]. Performing measurement-based quantum computation on the entangled qubits of an RHG lattice is more fault-tolerant because of its topological structure. Thus, we will call this fault-tolerant blind quantum computation topological blind quantum computation (TBQC). TBQC uses a decorated RHG lattice as the computation resource. Each qubit in the RHG lattice is independently entangled with two more qubits in a linear form.
The protocol of TBQC is as follows. First, Alice prepares and sends Bob all the randomly rotated qubits In TBQC, since Bob entangles the qubits in a fault-tolerant form, it guarantees the blind quantum computation is fault-tolerant under a certain error threshold. Alice doesn't necessarily perform additional fault-tolerant quantum computation in the process of blind quantum computation. The additional resource overhead of fault-tolerant BQC is only three times that of nonblind topological quantum computation. However, the detailed resource comparison of TBQC protocol and BFK's fault-tolerant BQC protocol has not been done. Though TBQC provides an explicit error threshold, the preparation error and transmission error cannot be corrected until all the qubits are entangled in a special form. Moreover the qubits may still suffer serious error during the transmission. If Alice sends qubits encoded in an error correction code, these qubits can be corrected at a relay in the middle of the network or right after being received by Bob.
BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTATION USING FAULT-TOLERANT CIRCUITS
To improve the fault-tolerance of blind quantum computation, we propose our first fault-tolerant quantum computation protocol which applies quantum error correction underneath blind quantum computation. All of the qubits in the blind quantum computation are encoded by one layer of the [[7,1,3] ] code and all quantum operations are replaced by fault-tolerant operations. Thus, Alice's computational capability must grow to have the ability to fault-tolerantly prepare error correction code blocks. Bob will use a fault-tolerant circuit to implement measurement-based quantum computation in blind quantum computation.
In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice has to prepare input logical qubits encoded in one layer of the [[7,1,3] ] code. All logical qubits are prepared by applying fault-tolerant phase shift gates to the 
Thus, Alice is required to do a small fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare each encoded logical qubit.
Bob also has to change his operations in our first fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol. His operation is similar to the BFK basic blind quantum computation protocol, except all quantum operations are fault-tolerant. In the basic protocol, Bob has to do two things: first, he entangles the received qubits to create a brickwork state; second, he sequentially measures each qubit in the M(δ x,y ) basis, where x, y represents the qubit in the x column and y row of the brickwork state, using the basis requested by Alice, and tells Alice the measurement results. The brickwork state can be divided into layers and then be divided into bricks shown in Figure 3(b) . The output qubits of each layer are the input qubits of the following layer. After the blind quantum computation is finished in the first layer, the second layer starts, and so on. Within each layer, every brick is independent. Thus, if Bob can do the fault-tolerant blind quantum computation on a brick, he can do the fault-tolerant blind quantum computation on the brickwork state.
Bob's quantum operations on a brick in the blind quantum computation are implemented by an equivalent quantum circuit as shown in Figure 9 (b). Ten qubits are Fig. 9 . The equivalent quantum circuit for the server's quantum operation on a brick in blind quantum computation, including entanglements, phase shift gates, Hadamard gates, and measurements. R represents a phase shift operation, which can be implemented by a composition of Z gate, S gate, and T gate. M represents measurement in the computational basis. Then this quantum circuit is transformed to a fault-tolerant quantum circuit which uses one layer of the [[7,1,3] ] code. Each qubit is replaced by a seven-qubit code block and all gates are changed to fault-tolerant quantum gates. For the fault-tolerant T gates and the fault-tolerant measurement in the computational basis, ancilla qubits are added to the circuit. Since the quantum circuit of blind quantum computation on a brick is fault-tolerant, the blind quantum computation on a brickwork state by repeating this quantum circuit is fault-tolerant.
Our first fault-tolerant protocol is shown in Protocol 1. Alice prepares each qubit in the brickwork state by fault-tolerantly preparing encoded |0 L state and fault-tolerantly applying a random phase shift on the code state. Then she sends it to Bob. Bob faulttolerantly entangles all the encoded logical qubits to create a brickwork state using fault-tolerant CZ gates as shown in Figure 9 (b). Then Bob performs a fault-tolerant phase shift (−δ x,y ) L , which is assigned by Alice, on each encoded logical qubit |ψ x,y L before measuring it in the computational basis. The phase shifts assigned by Alice are still calculated as in the BFK basic protocol. The phase shifts and measurements still follow the order of the column of the qubits. Since every qubit in this protocol is encoded with the error correction code and all quantum operations are performed by faulttolerant quantum circuits, this protocol is fault-tolerant. Except for the underlying quantum error correction code and the fault-tolerant quantum circuit, this protocol follows the BFK basic blind quantum computation. The fault-tolerant circuit to prepare encoded logical qubits, to entangle encoded logical qubits, and to measure encoded logical qubits are all independent of the inputs, outputs and the quantum gates in the target computation. Thus, the blindness of this protocol is the same as the BFK basic blind quantum computation. This protocol reveals only the information of the upper bound of the size of the computation.
From Figure 10 , we can clearly see the difference between the BFK fault-tolerant protocol and our first fault-tolerant protocol using fault-tolerant circuits. The top part of the figure shows what Alice should prepare before starting the blind quantum computation protocol. The bottom part of the figure shows how the blind quantum computation proceeds. In the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, Alice has to convert her target computation to a fault-tolerant quantum circuit with additional evenly-separated ancilla qubits measured in the computational basis at the same time with a regular interval. Then she converts the fault-tolerant quantum circuit to measurement patterns for the blind quantum computation. After that, she can perform the blind quantum computation using the basic protocol, with additional periodic measurements in the computational basis. In our first fault-tolerant protocol using fault-tolerant circuits, Alice converts her target circuit to measurement patterns for the blind quantum computation before she starts the fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol. Alice has to do fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare the encoded input qubits. Bob faulttolerantly entangles all the qubits and fault-tolerantly measures them.
Our first fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol provides more faulttolerance than the BFK fault-tolerant protocol and TBQC protocol. Teleporting QECencoded states protects against errors in our qubits that occur during the teleportation process. At the physical level, quantum repeater networks may reach reasonably high fidelities, but the error rates necessary to execute for instance, 10 15 logical gates successfully are out of the question for the foreseeable future. Our approach will be useful if Alice and Bob are not directly connected.
Compared to the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, our first fault-tolerant protocol has another advantage. Alice prepares fewer physical qubits and the amount of classical communication required between Alice and Bob is far less. In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice prepares a constant factor (seven times for Steane's [[7, 1, 3] ] code) more qubits than she needs in the BFK basic protocol. In the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, performing the fault-tolerant quantum computation on top of the brickwork state causes substantial growth in the size of the brickwork state, in part because the number of additional swap gates is linear in the size of the computation. These additional swap gates are used to avoid CNOT gates operating on nonadjacent qubits. Thus, Alice has to prepare a linear factor more qubits than she needs in the BFK basic protocol. Since Alice and Bob need to exchange classical messages between each measurement, preparing and measuring more qubits requires stricter conditions on classical communication latencies.
Our first fault-tolerant protocol has two disadvantages. First, Alice is required to do fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare encoded input qubits, and her quantum computational overhead is proportional to the number of qubits she prepared, which is the total size of the brickwork state. This is a tough requirement for Alice, who has limited quantum computing power. Second, Alice may leak some information which can be exploited by a side-channel attack. Since the fault-tolerant T gates consume much more quantum resources than other fault-tolerant gates, preparing encoded logical qubits
) L , where θ = π/4, 3π/4, 5π/4, 7π/4, consumes more power from Alice. If Bob or a third-party attacker can probe the computing power or the preparation time during Alice's preparation of encoded logical qubits, they can learn if the encoded logical qubits are prepared by fault-tolerant T gates. Thus, this protocol will not be perfectly secure. To overcome these two drawbacks of our first fault-tolerant protocol, we propose our second fault-tolerant protocol which requires Alice only to receive, buffer, and send qubits.
BUFFER SELECTION ALICE PROTOCOL
To lower Alice's required quantum computing power and to reduce her computational overhead, we propose the second protocol, which lets Bob prepare the encoded logical qubits. This protocol is called the Buffer Selection Alice (BSA) Protocol. To prepare input logical qubits with random phase, Alice only has to perform the operations required in quantum teleportation, in addition to buffering two logical qubits and performing S gates. The more difficult work of the logical T gates is transferred to Bob. One of the keys for protecting privacy in the universal blind quantum computation is that Alice has to prepare eight random phase-rotated qubits
) L , where θ = 0, π/4, 2π/4, 3π/4, 4π/4, 5π/4, 6π/4, 7π/4. In the quantum teleportation process when Alice sends qubits to Bob, Alice has to tell Bob the correction of Pauli-X and Pauli-Z operations to correctly send her original qubits. But if Alice keeps this information to herself, the transmitted qubits effectively will be randomly encrypted. While it might initially seem that the Pauli-X (bit flip) correction needs to be made, in fact this is not the case, as it results only in a sign change to the phase of the qubit when used for blind computation. Table I shows how the qubits will change without correction after quantum teleportation.
First, we will show how this trick can be applied in the first stage of universal blind quantum computation without fault-tolerant operations. To prepare each qubit The other qubit will be tested to see if Bob cheats. Alice then uses the test qubit to determine that Bob is following the protocol and sending the qubits that he is expected to send, by measuring either in the {(|0 + |1 )/ √ 2, (|0 − |1 )/ √ 2} basis or the {(|0 + e iπ/4 |1 )/ √ 2, (|0 + e i5π/4 |1 )/ √ 2} basis as appropriate. If Bob has attempted to cheat by sending qubits other than the ones expected in the protocol, over a series of such tests Alice will be able to recognize this as her measurements disagree with the expected values.
To generate the input qubit, Alice first secretly chooses at random to apply or not apply an S gate to the source qubit. Then she uses quantum teleportation to return the chosen input qubit to Bob. However, Alice doesn't follow the usual protocol of giving Bob her two bits of measurement results. Thus, the qubit Bob gets will be the source qubit with randomly applied S, Pauli-X, and Pauli-Z gates. Alice knows this random input qubit, but Bob does not. Moreover, the randomness of the state at Bob is guaranteed by the physics of the Bell state measurement in the teleportation, and thus is not subject to flaws in, for instance, a pseudo-random number generator. Indeed, if the final qubit, Bob's half of the Bell pair, were capable of leaking any information, it could be used as a faster-than-light communication channel.
Thus, the first stage of blind quantum computation is done. The second stage is the interactive measurement process between Alice and Bob using either BFK's UBQC protocol or MF's BTMBQC protocol.
Adding fault tolerance, the BSA protocol using BFK's brickwork state is similar except that the operations are conducted on logical rather than physical qubits. In the first stage, a brickwork state will be created for the blind quantum computation. For each encoded logical qubit in the brickwork state, Bob fault-tolerantly prepares a fixed set of two different logical qubits encoded in the [[7,1,3] 
Two encoded qubits, comprised of fourteen physical qubits, are sent to Alice in fixed order using quantum teleportation. Alice randomly selects one encoded logical qubit as the source qubit |α L and the other one as the test qubit |τ L . The test qubit |τ L will be measured by Alice. From statistical measurement results, Alice can test if Bob cheats. The source logical qubit will first have a fault-tolerant S gate applied at random. Then these seven qubits are sent back to Bob using quantum teleportation, but this time Alice doesn't tell Bob her real Bell-measurement results. Alice effectively applies additional encryption with random Pauli-X and Pauli-Z operations to Bob's received logical qubits by keeping secret the two bits normally sent to Bob in each quantum teleportation. As seen in Table I , Bob's received logical qubit will be a random qubit from (|0 + |1 ) L logical qubits encoded in one-layer of the Steane's [[7, 1, 3] ] code and applies fault-tolerant phase shift gates θ x,y , where θ x,y = 0, π/4 to these qubits respectively. Then the set of two encoded logical qubits is sent to Alice in a fixed order using quantum teleportation. a fault-tolerant quantum circuit, as shown in Figure 9 (b). The second stage is the interactive measurement stage, which is the same as our first protocol. Alice calculates the δ of the measurement basis M(δ) and sends the value to Bob via the classical channel. Bob fault-tolerantly measures each encoded logical qubit in the M(δ) basis and sends back the measurement result to Alice for her later calculation. This protocol is shown in Protocol 2.
Since every qubit in the BSA protocol is encoded with quantum error correction and all quantum operations are performed by fault-tolerant quantum circuits, this protocol is fault-tolerant. However, the BSA protocol's blindness characteristics differ from our first fault-tolerant protocol or BFK's protocol. We will discuss the blindness of the BSA protocol in two cases. In the first case, Bob prepares correct qubits
In the second case, Bob cheats by prepared two special orthogonal seven-qubit states. Beyond these two cases, the security analysis is essentially identical to that of the original protocols. In the first case, if Bob prepares the correct qubits, he will not get any information about the computation in BSA protocol except the dimension of the brickwork state, which reveals an upper bound of the size of the computation. The information revealed to Bob is the classical information of measurement basis requested by Alice and the quantum information of the qubits in the brickwork states.
First, we will show the independence of classical information that Alice revealed. Alice has two secret classical bit strings in the computation. One is the randomly-selected phase of the input qubits (θ ). The other one is the measurement angles (φ ) for blind quantum computation, determined by the algorithm being executed and the previous measurement results. Alice tells Bob a classical bit string δ, which controls Bob's measurement angle of the qubits. The angle is calculated as follows.
where r is a random bit string prepared by Alice, derived in part from the Pauli frame corrections for teleportation that Alice kept hidden. Since θ is uniformly random chosen from 0, π/4, . . . , 7π/4, then θ + πr is also uniformly random. Critically, this shows that δ and φ are independent. Thus, Bob can't gain any information from the classical information about the measurement angles. Second, we will show the independence of the quantum information that Alice revealed. For a fixed choice of δ, each qubit |ψ x,y in the brickwork state will be one of the following states.
(1) If r x,y = 0 and
(2) If r x,y = 1 and
Since r x,y is uniformly random and independent of everything else, the state that Bob holds is, from his point of view, a mixed state consisting of 50% of the state in case 1 and 50% of the state in case 2. An informal proof of this is presented in the Appendix. This shows that, when Bob follows the protocol, no information can leak from Alice to Bob, or to an eavesdropper elsewhere on the network. This is independent of whether the qubits are logical qubits or physical qubits, as the constraints on information and privacy are the same. Moreover, the use of the test bits will serve as an ongoing check on the fidelity of the network and the end-to-end operation, reassuring us that the system is working properly.
In the second case, if Bob cheats by preparing illegal qubits, he will either be caught or gain only limited information about the computation. The only way Bob can learn Alice's choice of initial qubit with certainty is to prepare two orthogonal qubit states. Bob can measure the qubits after Alice sends them back and determine which of the two qubit she intended to return. If Bob cheats by preparing two orthogonal states (such as |0 L and |1 L ), he can learn Alice's selection by measuring the seven-qubit state sent back from Alice. Bob will learn if the input logical qubit is in the group of θ = 0, π/2, π, 3π/2 or in the group of θ = π/4, 3π/4, 5π/4, 7π/4. Since φ = δ−θ , Bob can tell if φ and φ are in the group of 0, π/2, π, 3π/2 or in the group of π/4, 3π/4, 5π/4, 7π/4. However, this attack works only if Alice discloses the Pauli frame corrections resulting from her BSM to Bob. If she keeps those bits secret, Bob can see the returned qubit only as the fully mixed that reveals no information (see the Appendix). Again we are saved by the fundamental constraint of teleportation to not transmit information faster than light or without the corrections.
Moreover, Alice will verify one of the qubits prepared by Bob each time. The correct initial qubit set and the cheating orthogonal qubit set will produce different results in statistical measurements over a short series of tests. Thus, the BSA protocol still protects the privacy of the computation even if the server cheats.
Compared to our first fault-tolerant protocol, the BSA protocol lowers the quantum computing requirement for Alice and still preserves the same fault-tolerance ability. Alice is only required to perform quantum teleportation and quantum S gates. Since Alice doesn't have to do fault-tolerant T gates to prepare different encoded logical qubits, the side-channel attack described in the last section will not work on the BSA protocol.
The BSA protocol has two differences from the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, see Figure 10 . First, quantum error correction and fault-tolerant quantum circuit is applied underneath the blind quantum computation in the BSA protocol, while quantum error correction and fault-tolerant quantum circuit is applied on top of the blind quantum computation in the BFK fault-tolerant protocol. Second, Alice buffers and selects encoded logical qubits prepared by Bob in the BSA protocol, while Alice prepares qubits with random phase shifts in the BFK fault-tolerant protocol.
The BSA protocol still provides more fault-tolerance than the BFK fault-tolerant protocol and TBQC protocol. Alice and Bob can be connected by a long and noisy channel if quantum error correction can be performed on the states end-to-end. In addition, the BSA protocol uses fewer qubits and requires less quantum and classical communication between Alice and Bob. For each logical qubit in the brickwork state, Bob sends two logical qubits to Alice. Alice returns one logical qubit to Bob. The total number of physical qubits transmitted in the quantum channel is 21 times the number of logical qubits in the brickwork state.
There are two tradeoffs in the BSA protocol. First, Alice has to measure prepared qubits to check if Bob cheats. Fortunately, no information will leak to Bob. The privacy of the computation is still well protected. Second, the BSA protocol consumes three times as much network bandwidth (that is, three times as many end-to-end Bell pairs are requested from the repeater network) as simply having Alice prepare and teleport the logical qubits, as in our first fault-tolerant protocol.
From the BFK fault-tolerant protocol and our two fault-tolerant protocols, we can see that fault-tolerant blind quantum computation costs much more in terms of quantum resources than the basic BFK blind quantum computation protocol. In the BFK faulttolerant protocol, the more complex fault-tolerant quantum circuit requires a much larger brickwork state. Alice also has to prepare more qubits. In our two fault-tolerant protocols, transmitting encoded logical qubits via quantum channel consumes more quantum network bandwidth. In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice even has to do quantum computation to prepare encoded logical qubits. We will examine the resource consumption in our two fault-tolerant protocols in the next section.
RESOURCE ANALYSIS
To show the difference in resource consumption of our protocols, we analyse the blind quantum computation of a 10-bit quantum carry-lookahead (QCLA) adder [Draper et al. 2006] . A quantum adder is a useful component for constructing multipliers and more elaborate circuits. It is also a basic subroutine in Shor's algorithm [Shor 1997; Vedral et al. 1996; Beckman et al. 1996] . The QCLA adder has a logarithmic depth in the number of input qubits. A quantum circuit for a 10-bit in-place QCLA adder is illustrated in Figure 11 .
To do a blind quantum computation, we need to convert the target quantum circuit to measurement-based computation on a brickwork state. First, the quantum circuit is converted to an equivalent circuit using single-qubit gates and CNOT gates. Second, we add swap gates in the circuit to make sure all CNOT gates operate on adjacent qubits. Third, we arrange each quantum gate to fit in a brick of the brickwork state. Each line in the circuit corresponds to a row of qubits in the brickwork state. Since the bricks are even-odd interleaved in the brickwork state, CNOT gates can only be arranged in specific layers. Fourth, in each brick, we assign each qubit a measurement basis according to the quantum gate implemented by the brick.
We will take a Toffoli gate as an example to show how to convert the quantum circuit to measurement-based quantum computation. First, a Toffoli gate is decomposed to one-qubit gates and two-qubit gates as shown in Figure 12 (a) [Shende and Markov 2009] . Second, two swap gates are added to make CNOT gates operate on adjacent Fig. 11 . An 10-bit in-place quantum carry-lookahead adder. s is the sum of a and b. The subscript indexes the bit in the number. [Draper et al. 2006] . qubits as shown in Figure 12 (b). Swap gates are also decomposed to three consecutive CNOT gates, as there is no simpler construction of swap on the brickwork state. Third, all quantum gates are arranged into a brick in the brickwork state as shown in Figure 12 (c). Some one-qubit gates and the following CNOT gates can be implemented in the same brick. Figure 12(d) shows the brickwork state required to do the decomposed circuit of a Toffoli gate in blind quantum computation. There are 14 layers of bricks. Three input qubits in the circuit makes three rows of qubits in the brickwork state. Thus, this brickwork state consists of 171 qubits. A brick consists of 10 qubits, but some qubits in the first row and in the last row cannot form a brick. The entangled five-qubit groups, called half-bricks, can also implement one-qubit gates. The last step is to assign each qubit a measurement basis according to the quantum gate implemented by the brick. For those half-bricks or bricks which implement no quantum gates in the circuit, they just implement one or two single-qubit identity gates. Thus every qubit is assigned a measurement basis, except the last column of qubits which are the output qubits.
Before calculating the resource consumption of a 10-bit QCLA adder in our protocol, we first calculate the resource consumption of the fault-tolerant quantum circuit for a 10-bit QCLA adder. The original circuit of a 10-bit QCLA adder has 35 input qubits, and it consists of 63 Toffoli gates, 35 CNOT gates, and 18 NOT gates. Each Toffoli gate can be decomposed into 7 T /T † gates, 6 CNOT gates, and 2 H gates. With the decomposition of the Toffoli gates, the decomposed circuit consists of 441 T /T † gates, 413 CNOT gates, and 144 one-qubit Clifford group gates, and the number of its input qubits remains the same. To implement a fault-tolerant T gate, we need to prepare a |0 L state before preparing the Figure 6 , the fault-tolerant circuit to prepare |0 L state consists of 108 CNOT gates, 18 Hadamard gates, and a Z gate. From Figure 4 (g), a fault-tolerant T gate consists of 21 T gate, 262 two-qubit Clifford group gates, 50 one-qubit Clifford group gates, and 35 measurements. Other faulttolerant Clifford-group gates are implemented by applying non-fault-tolerant gates transversally on each physical qubit. If we apply one layer of Steane's [[7, 1, 3] ] code and fault-tolerant gates to this circuit, the fault-tolerant decomposed circuit consists of 9,261 T /T † , 118,433 two-qubit Clifford group gates, 23,058 one-qubit Clifford group gates, and 15,435 measurements. This fault-tolerant circuit requires 245 qubits and at least 15 ancilla qubits for fault-tolerant T gates.
In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice has to prepare the encoded logical qubits. We will calculate the resource consumption of this process. All qubits are prepared from an initial |0 L state. To prepare
On average, Alice uses 10.5 T gates, 239 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 56.25 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 35.5 measurements in preparing each encoded logical qubit. Alice also needs to have at least 22 physical qubits because a fault-tolerant T gate requires at least 15 ancilla qubits.
In our fault-tolerant blind quantum computation, for each brick, Bob will perform 10 fault-tolerant CZ gates, 8 fault-tolerant phase shift, 8 fault-tolerant Hadamard gates, and 8 fault-tolerant measurements in the computational basis. Bob has to do eight different fault-tolerant phase shift, which are implemented by Here we will calculate the resource consumption of performing a 10-bit QCLA adder on blind quantum computation. First, we know the decomposed circuit of a 10-bit QCLA adder consists of 441 T /T † gates, 413 CNOT gates, and 144 one-qubit Clifford group gates, and it has 35 input qubits. Second, we added 328 swap gates to the circuit to make CNOT gates operate on adjacent qubits. Third, after arranging quantum gates to bricks with hand-optimization, we need 612 layers of bricks. Since it has 35 input qubits, we need a brickwork state with 35 rows. Thus, the total number of qubits in this brickwork state is (1 + 612 × 4) × 35 = 85, 715. The brickwork state consists of 10,404 bricks and 612 half-bricks. In the implementation of BQC, the server (Bob) does not have all of the qubits of the entire brickwork state in memory at the same time; construction and entanglement can be done "just in time," as is standard with measurement-based computation.
In the BFK basic blind quantum computation, Alice needs a special qubit generator, and she has to prepare 85,715 qubits with random phase. For each brick, Bob has to perform 10 entanglements, 8 phase shift, 8 Hadamard gates and 8 measurements in the computational basis. For each half-brick, Bob has to perform 4 entanglements, 4 phase shift, 4 Hadamard gates and 4 measurement in the computational basis. Thus, Bob has to perform 42,840 T gates, 106,488 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 149,940 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 85,680 measurements. In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice needs a small quantum computer which consists of at least 22 qubits. She has to perform about 900,007.5 T gates, 20,485,885 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 4,821,468.75 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 3,042,882.5 measurements in preparing encoded logical qubits. Bob has to perform about 899,640 T gates, 15,568,056 twoqubit Clifford-group gates, 3,534,300 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 2,441,880 measurements. In our BSA fault-tolerant protocol, Bob has to perform about 1,800,015 T gates, 40,971,770 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 9,642,938 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 6,085,765 measurements in preparing encoded logical qubits. In addition, Bob also has to perform about 899,640 T gates, 15,568,056 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 3,534,300 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 2,441,880 measurements for blind quantum computation. Alice has to receive and send qubits via quantum teleportation. She will receive two times the number of qubits in the brickwork state and send back the number of qubits in the brickwork state. After receiving a set of two encoded qubits, she only has to perform Pauli operations to correct the one used for verification because the qubits in the input encoded qubit can be corrected after they are teleported back to Bob. To receive qubits, Alice has to perform 600,005 one-qubit Clifford-group gates and 600,005 measurements on average. To send qubits, Alice has to perform 600,005 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 600,005 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 1,200,010 measurements.
Tables II-IV show the comparison of resource consumption of performing a 10-bit QCLA adder using our fault-tolerant protocol. In the BFK basic protocol, compared to the target circuit, a 10-bit QCLA adder requires Bob more than 97 times as many quantum gates, and Alice has to prepare 85,715 qubits. Compared to the fault-tolerant quantum circuit of a 10-bit QCLA adder using 260 qubits, our first fault-tolerant protocol makes Alice perform more than 97 times as many quantum gates, but she needs only a small 22-qubit quantum computer. Compared to our first fault-tolerant protocol, our BSA protocol greatly reduce the quantum computation overhead of Alice and requires Bob to execute 3 times more quantum gates. We can see the benefit of the BSA protocol is that Alice doesn't have to perform the T gate and most of her operations are conducting quantum teleportation. A complete analysis of the arithmetic portion of Shor's algorithm is beyond the scope of this article. However, the VBE form of the modular exponentiation uses ∼ 20n 2 calls to the adder circuit, suggesting that this step would require a blind operation some 2,000 times the size of our example adder in order to factor a ten-bit number [Van Meter and Itoh 2005; Vedral et al. 1996] . This would be a total of about 171 million qubits using the BFK basic BQC protocol.
CONCLUSIONS
We propose two fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol which applies quantum error correction underneath the blind quantum computation. The first faulttolerant protocol has two advantages. First, it provides more fault-tolerance than previously proposed approaches. Second, the client prepares fewer qubits. However, the trade-off of the protocol is that the client needs a small quantum computer. Because of that, the client may leak some information which can be exploited by a side-channel attack. The second fault-tolerant protocol requires the client to do only quantum teleportation and S gates while preserving the two advantages of the first protocol. Thus, the side-channel attack that works against the first protocol does not work against this protocol. The second protocol has two trade-offs. First, Alice has to measure qubits to check if Bob cheats because the T gate disposition in the target computation may be retrieved by cheating Bob. Second, this protocol uses three times more bandwidth of the quantum channel. We also provide a simple analysis on the resource consumption of fault-tolerant blind quantum computation. Compared to the BFK basic blind quantum computation, the overhead of our fault-tolerant blind quantum computation is increased by a constant factor.
Our work can be further extended in the following ways. First, the idea of making the server prepare encoded logical qubits can be applied to other blind quantum computation protocols, for example, the blind topological measurement-based quantum computation [Morimae and Fujii 2012] . Second, the optimization of quantum circuit for blind quantum computation is an important issue because the client's overhead is proportional to the size of the brickwork state. Third, quantum resources used in transmitting qubit via quantum teleportation should be considered because that is also a nonnegligible overhead.
APPENDIX INFORMAL PROOF OF COMPLETELY MIXED STATES IN BSA
The Buffer Selection Alice protocol, in which Alice selects qubits from those sent to her by Bob, presents some subtleties in proving that Bob cannot distinguish Alice's choices, even when he cheats and sends her different states than those called for in the protocol.
In order to discuss this in detail, we need to introduce an additional formalism, the density matrix. The density matrix, in contrast to the state vector notation introduced in Section 2.1, can represent classical probabilities as well as quantum superpositions, and is used when discussing imperfections in quantum states. It is defined as
where each |ψ i is a pure state, and p i is the classical probability of finding the system in that state. ψ| is the complex conjugate row vector corresponding to |ψ . For a superposition state such as |ψ = (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2, the density matrix is ρ = |ψ ψ| = |0 + |1 √ 2 0| + 1| √ 2 (6) = 1 2 (|0 0| + |0 1| + |1 0| + |1 1|)
= 1 2 1 1 1 1 .
In contrast, a classical 50/50 state, such as a coin flip with an unannounced result, is written as the d.m. 
In the BSA protocol run properly, |ψ x,y has multiple possibilities. A little algebra shows that the state Bob holds is ρ = |ψ x,y i ψ x,y | i = |0 0| + |1 1| 2 = ρ 50/50 ,
which is by definition the completely mixed state indistinguishable from noise. Thus, Bob can't get any information from the qubits in his hand. Remarkably, even when Bob tries to subvert the processing by sending other states, blindness is retained because Alice keeps the Pauli frame correction information secret.
